Guides
How to check your Optimizely Web Experimentation scripts
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Short answer. In each Optimizely Web Experimentation project, open Settings > JavaScript and read the Project JavaScript line by line, then do the same for shared code, variation code and extensions. Open the project's History, filter on Project JavaScript, and match every change to a named colleague and a reason. Then list everyone and everything that can change that code: Administrators, Project owners, anyone with the Code Editor, REST API tokens and integrations. Keep that group small, keep an approved copy of every custom script, and use a Content Security Policy to limit where scripts can load from and send data to.
Why this matters now. On November 16, 2026, an attacker edited the Project JavaScript field in some Optimizely Web Experimentation projects. Optimizely says the vulnerability is fixed, the injected code is removed and fewer than 5% of its customers were affected. When we checked on November 19, 2026, Optimizely had not marked the incident resolved, and the investigation it opened with Mandiant was still under way. The incident is remediated, and the investigation is open.
This guide covers how to check your projects, what to review for November 16, how to handle the points where sources disagree, and how to govern experimentation and other third-party scripts from now on.
What Project JavaScript is and why it matters
Optimizely Web Experimentation runs through one snippet per project, loaded on your pages. Optimizely's documentation says Project JavaScript is the first code to run in that snippet, and it runs on every page that loads the snippet, whether or not an experiment is running.
That makes the field powerful. Anyone who can edit it can run code in the browser of every visitor to every page with the snippet, without touching your site's own code or servers. Report URI found that sites serving the snippet from their own domain were affected too, because the content still comes from the same Optimizely project.
How to check Project JavaScript and other custom code
Check every project, including development and staging projects. Optimizely's documentation shows where each kind of custom code lives:
- Project JavaScript. Go to Settings > JavaScript in each project. Custom snippets inherit Project JavaScript from the project they pull from, so checking the project covers them.
- Shared code. In each experiment, open Design > Shared Code and read the JavaScript tab.
- Variation code. Open each variation's Variation Code Editor and read the JavaScript tab.
- Extensions. Read the Apply JS and Reset JS of each extension your team built.
Look for anything you did not write. Report URI advises searching for 1688360.cc and atob(, because one version of the loader hid its address in base64 and a search for the domain alone can miss it. Also look for eval(, new script tags and code that loads from a host you do not recognize.
Then check what your pages actually receive. Open the snippet URL your site loads (it ends with your project ID and .js) and search it the same way. What the editor shows and what visitors receive should match.
Indicators published so far
Both lists are preliminary. Block these domains and search your web, CDN, firewall, proxy and CSP logs for them. We wrote them with [.] so they cannot be clicked.
- Optimizely's customer report (November 17, 2026).
pay-relay.wordpressadmin001.workers[.]dev, the endpoint that received stolen data. Optimizely calls any browser request from your site to it a strong sign the skimmer ran. Alsopay-cloud[.]onlineandpay.pay-cloud[.]online. - Report URI (November 16, updated November 17).
1688360[.]cc,webshell[.]lol,5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icuandeil786npto9u5bq[.]icu. Its post lists more hosts, file hashes and markers.
How to read the change history
Optimizely keeps a change history for each project. Go to History in the project. You can filter by Type, Date and Source, and Source shows whether a change came through the REST API or the Web Experimentation interface. Optimizely says the history records all changes to Project JavaScript, as well as variation changes made in the Visual Editor and the Code Editor.
- Filter on Project JavaScript and on November 16, 2026, then widen the range to the days before and after.
- Match every change to a named colleague, a request and a reason. A change you cannot match is a finding.
- Do not stop at the name on the entry. Optimizely says the attacker impersonated existing users on targeted accounts, so a change logged under a colleague's name still needs that colleague to confirm it.
- Check Source. A REST API change from a token nobody recognizes deserves a closer look.
- Save what you find with your incident notes. Optimizely says customers can get project timelines and logs from their Customer Success Manager or support@optimizely.com.
Who has write access
Write access to code in Web Experimentation comes from roles, tokens and integrations. Optimizely's collaborator roles set most of it:
- Administrators have full access to every project in the account, including billing, and can add or remove other administrators.
- Project owners can change snippet settings, add collaborators and manage integrations on the projects they own.
- Publishers can create, edit and publish experiments, but cannot change project configuration such as the snippet.
- Editors can create experiments but cannot start them. Optimizely lists the Code Editor as available to Editors, Project owners and Administrators.
- Restricted publishers and restricted editors work only through pre-made extensions, without the Visual Editor or Code Editor. Viewers can only review.
Roles are set per project, except Administrator, which applies to the whole account, so check every project. List who holds each role and remove anyone who has left or no longer needs it. If your organization moved to Opti ID, manage these users there. Then list every REST API token and every integration that can change a project, with an owner for each.
One caveat. Tighter access would not have stopped this particular attack, which Optimizely says came through a flaw in the account signup flow, not stolen passwords. Fewer people with write access still means fewer accounts that can change code on your pages, and a shorter change history to check.
Where the sources disagree
Passwords and API tokens
Optimizely says this was not a credentials breach, and its customer report says you do not need to reset passwords or regenerate API tokens. Report URI recommends reviewing who and what has write access, including users, API tokens and integrations, and rotating credentials. Rotating is a precaution you can choose, and Optimizely does not require it. Report URI also advises treating session tokens or secrets in cookies not marked HttpOnly as exposed and rotating them, because the script sent page-readable cookies to the attacker.
Which time window to review
Optimizely's customer report dates the first malicious write to 07:51 UTC on November 16 and says the code was removed from all affected projects by 22:24 UTC. Report URI first saw the loader at 04:21 UTC and saw every infected file clean by 23:11 UTC. One timeline comes from Optimizely's logs and the other from outside observation. Review all of November 16, 2026, UTC. In Eastern time, that runs from 7 p.m. on November 15 to 7 p.m. on November 16. Ask Optimizely for your own project's exposure window, and keep your logs for that day.
Content Security Policy
A well-configured Content Security Policy (CSP) could have stopped this attack on many sites, as Report URI's results below show. It is still not a full fix on its own. The malicious code arrived inside a snippet from a domain every affected site already allowed. Optimizely's CSP help page recommends a script-src line with a nonce and 'strict-dynamic'. Report URI found that 'strict-dynamic' let the attacker's script through, because the browser trusts any script a trusted script adds. It also found that 'unsafe-eval', which it says Optimizely's documentation tells customers to allow, let an inline copy of the payload run on a site where the remote script was blocked.
Of the affected organizations' sites that Report URI evaluated, 68 had no CSP, 50 had a CSP that allowed both the payload and the data theft, 17 blocked the data theft but not the payload, and 24 blocked the payload outright. On the 17, wallet address swapping still worked, because it happens inside the page.
Removing the snippet
Optimizely says it removed the injected code and that no malicious code remains in its systems. It does not require customers to remove the snippet. Some organizations turned Optimizely scripts off as a precaution. Salesforce, for example, says it disabled them on its sites until Optimizely's remediation is verified. Keeping the snippet off pages that collect payment, login or personal details is a precaution you can weigh, not a requirement.
Notifying customers
Whether you must tell customers, a regulator or anyone else depends on what ran on your pages, what data was at risk and where you operate. Optimizely's customer report recommends getting legal advice on notification duties, and Report URI suggests considering whether to tell your customers. Consult your legal counsel.
The November 16, 2026 case in brief
- What happened. According to Optimizely's status page (update of November 18, 2026, 14:49 UTC), an unauthorized third party exploited a flaw in the Web Experimentation account signup flow, impersonated users on targeted customer accounts and inserted malicious JavaScript into those customers' projects.
- Scope. Optimizely says fewer than 5% of its customers were affected and the incident was limited to Web Experimentation. Its customer report says Feature Experimentation, the SDKs and legacy Full Stack were not affected. Optimizely says it contacted every Web Experimentation customer directly.
- Report URI's count. Report URI checked 1,611 Optimizely snippets and found the loader in 188 of them, belonging to 178 organizations. It says the real number is likely higher, because it could only check the snippets it found in time. This is Report URI's figure, not Optimizely's.
- What the code did. Report URI says the payload swapped cryptocurrency wallet addresses, captured card details typed into a site's own form fields, sent page-readable cookies and screenshots to the attacker, and loaded exploit kits on iPhones and iPads. Cards entered in a payment provider's hosted fields were out of its reach.
- Status. Optimizely says the vulnerability is fixed and the injected code removed. When we checked on November 19, 2026, the incident was not marked resolved, and Mandiant's investigation, the root cause and the final indicators were still pending.
- Coverage. CMSWire reported on Optimizely's update on November 18, 2026.
How to govern experimentation and third-party scripts
Experimentation tools are one kind of third-party script. Tag managers, analytics, chat and personalization tools carry the same risk, because code you did not write runs on your pages. Report URI links the same actor to injections through other third-party scripts in the days before November 16. These habits apply to all of them.
- Keep an inventory. List every script on your pages, who owns it, why it is there and which pages load it. Remove what nobody owns.
- Treat custom code as production code. Keep an approved copy of Project JavaScript and other custom code in your code repository, review changes before they go live, and compare what the snippet serves with the approved copy on a schedule.
- Limit who can change code. Give the Administrator and Project owner roles to as few people as possible, review roles every quarter, and give each API token and integration a named owner. Use single sign-on with multifactor authentication where your account allows it.
- Keep sensitive pages lean. Load as few third-party scripts as you can on pages that collect payment, login or personal details, and keep card entry in your payment provider's hosted fields.
- Use a CSP as one layer. List the hosts your scripts need in script-src, restrict connect-src to destinations you recognize, avoid 'unsafe-eval' where your features allow it, and decide on 'strict-dynamic' knowing what your trusted scripts load. Optimizely suggests trying changes in report-only mode first and collecting the violation reports.
- Mark session cookies HttpOnly. Scripts running on the page cannot read them.
- Keep evidence. Retain web server, CDN, firewall and CSP logs long enough to answer what ran on a given day. Optimizely recommends keeping logs that cover at least November 16, 2026.
Frequently asked questions
Was our site affected?
Optimizely says it contacted every Web Experimentation customer directly to confirm whether they were affected. If you are unsure, ask your Customer Success Manager or support@optimizely.com for your project timeline and exposure window, and run the checks above.
Are other Optimizely products affected?
Optimizely says no other product was affected, and its customer report names Feature Experimentation, the SDKs and legacy Full Stack as not affected. Optimizely says customers who do not use Web Experimentation do not need to do anything.
Do we need to reset passwords or API tokens?
Optimizely says no. Report URI recommends reviewing write access and rotating credentials as a precaution. If you rotate, use the moment to confirm who and what still needs access.
Do we need to remove the Optimizely snippet?
Optimizely does not require it. Keeping it off pages that collect payment, login or personal details is a precaution some organizations take.
Does a Content Security Policy stop this kind of attack?
A strict one could have stopped it on many sites. In Report URI's sample, 24 affected sites blocked the payload outright and 17 blocked the data theft. It is not enough on its own, because the code came from a domain sites already allowed, and 'strict-dynamic' and 'unsafe-eval' let parts of it through.
What time window should we review?
All of November 16, 2026, UTC. Report URI first saw the loader at 04:21 UTC, and Optimizely dates the first malicious write to 07:51 UTC.
Do we have to notify customers?
It depends on your situation and where you operate. Consult your legal counsel.
How Sengo can help
Sengo is a certified Optimizely partner. This guide is based on the public sources linked here.
In every Sengo project, the exploration phase always includes a security audit that validates points like these, including your third-party scripts, who can change them and your Content Security Policy.
If your team also runs Optimizely CMS, our free Optimizely technical audit reviews your custom code, integrations and hosting, then recommends PaaS with CMS 13 or SaaS, with a 3-year cost view. To talk through your Optimizely setup with us directly, book a 30-minute discovery call.
Sources
- Optimizely, Web Experimentation Security Incident, status page update of November 18, 2026, 14:49 UTC (checked November 19, 2026).
- Optimizely, customer report on the Web Experimentation incident, November 17, 2026.
- Report URI, World's Largest Brands Infected With Malware Via Optimizely, November 16, 2026, updated November 17, 2026.
- CMSWire, Optimizely Says Signup Flaw Let Attacker Plant Malicious Code in Customer Projects, November 18, 2026.
- Salesforce, Our response to the Optimizely supply chain compromise, November 18, 2026.
- Optimizely documentation: View change history, Manage collaborators, Update your site's Content Security Policies and When to use custom code, shared code, project JavaScript and extensions.
Also running Optimizely CMS? Get a free technical audit
For teams that also run Optimizely CMS. We review the custom code, integrations and hosting of your site, then recommend PaaS with CMS 13 or SaaS, with a 3-year cost view.

